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Abstract
Complementing market-based policy instruments with conflict analysis approaches provides a wider
understanding of market situations and allows to identify minimal requirements regarding needs, power
and conflict dynamics. If these are not met, a market cannot be successfully introduced or a
liberalization process implemented. Conflict analysis offers a language better suited to the concerns of
people negatively affected by new markets. Applying this language helps to counterbalance the
predominance of economic concepts. This fosters mutual understanding and enhances the prospect for
successful implementation of market-based policies. We illustrate the potential of conflict analysis with
examples from water privatization and labeling.
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Complementing  market-based  policy instruments  with  conflict  analysis  approaches
provides a wider understanding of market situations and allows to identify minimal
requirements regarding needs, power and conflict dynamics. If these are not met, a
market  cannot  be successfully  introduced  or  a  liberalization  process  implemented.
Conflict analysis offers a language better suited to the concerns of people negatively
affected  by  new  markets.  Applying  this  language  helps  to  counterbalance  the
predominance of economic concepts. This fosters mutual understanding and enhances
the prospect for successful implementation of market-based policies. We illustrate the
potential of conflict analysis with examples from water privatization and labeling.
Keywords: market interactions, liberalization, privatization, labeling, conflict analysis,
needs
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1 Introduction
In the last three decades, market-based policy instruments have become increasingly
popular. This is so in various contexts, particularly in environmental policy making
and in network industries. The main rationale to implement such policy instruments is
that  they  provide  cost-effective  measures  to  increase  efficiency  by  correcting  for
market or policy failures.
Here  we  understand  market-based  policy  instruments  as  instruments  fostering
activities  through  market  signals  instead  of  explicit  governmental  directives.  The
design of these instruments is based on “harnessing market forces” to set the right
incentives for efficient actions of the economic actors. Examples of such instruments
are new tax regimes to internalize external costs, markets for newly introduced and
designed  goods  like  tradable  pollution  permits,  or  newly  established  markets  in
previously tightly regulated sectors like electricity. 
The introduction of new markets  faces a  general  skepticism from various  parts  of
society.  Especially  implementation  in  new  and  less  traditional  settings  causes
controversy,  because  political  and  social  concerns are  often accentuated  there.  We
argue that the design and the assessment of these instruments has to pay due attention
to this debate and to the fears of opponents. Today, formal  concepts dominate and
non-economic aspects – the so-called “soft factors” – often tend to be neglected1. As
an alternative, we propose to employ a conflict analysis framework to complement
economic analysis. This offers a promising set of concepts and methods to address the
“soft factors” in a systematic way. 
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The motivation to employ a conflict analysis framework is given by the observation
that  any  real  –  and  thus  necessarily  incomplete  –  market  situation  is  a  potential
conflict. Such a conflict can, for example, be caused by non-internalized externalities,
market  power  or  asymmetric  information.  A  market  situation  often  introduces  a
conflict  in  the  social  relations  among  its  participants,  yet  ignores  the  difference
between basic needs and luxury goods, for example, or the psychological dynamics of
power  asymmetry  and  escalation  that  may  result  if  the  accompanying  regulatory
framework is inadequate. Examples are the conflicts in the context of liberalization
and privatization in the water sector (Postel  and Wolf 2001) or conflicts related to
effects of globalize markets on smallholders (Ellis and Seeley 2001).
By  combining  economics  and  conflict  analysis  we  can  explore  the  demarcation
between the arguments for free markets and increased efficiency and the arguments
for governmental institutions and privately initiated cooperation. The paper also adds
to the discourse on whether “competition destroys ethical behavior” (Shleifer 2004).
Shleifer  discusses  cases  where  unethical  conduct  is  a  consequence  of  market
competition, but he sees the solution of these problems in competition as well. Our
article promotes a new understanding of this situation and the inclusion of broader
non-economic  solutions.  Related  discourses  are  those  on  “obnoxious  markets”
(Kanbur  2001)  and  on  the  notion  of  “power” employed in  economics  (Rothschild
2002). Conflict analysis helps to discuss these issues within a single framework.
Our  approach  also  sheds  a  different  light  on  the  relationship  between  economic
interdependence  and  (interstate)  conflict.  A  growing  body  of  empirical  research
supports the claim that open international markets and heightened economic exchange
inhibit interstate hostilities (Mansfield and Pollins 2001). The general argument is that
once traders or consumers become dependent on foreign markets, they are unwilling to
support public officials engaging in hostile actions towards these countries. However,
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more research is needed concerning which groups within a society benefit from and
which groups are harmed by commercial openness (Mansfield and Pollins 2001). We
argue here that by using a different and wider conflict definition one can better grasp
these aspects.  We do not argue against  the liberal  claim that  open markets  inhibit
hostilities, but we outline some framework conditions that need to be considered if one
seeks to introduce markets in such a way as to benefit all groups of a society.
In  this  paper,  “market-based  policy  instruments”  and  the  “conflict  analysis
framework” are seen as two viewpoints on a complex situation - a real market. The
goal of this paper is to introduce the conflict viewpoint as a complementary approach
to the traditional economic one.  Section 2 introduces the basics of conflict analysis
and section 3 discusses the links between conflicts and markets. Section 4 presents
conflict analysis in the context of market-related conflicts, contrasting them with the
market-based approach. Two examples serve as illustrations. Section 5 concludes. 
2  Conflicts  –  Definition,  Characterization  and  Conflict  Analysis
Approaches
We first give the definition of a conflict: 
 “A social conflict arises when: 1) at least two parties interact; 2) at least one of these
parties experiences damage from the interaction; and 3) at least one of these parties
intends  or  ignores  the  negative  impacts  on  the  other  party  stemming  from  the
interaction.” (adapted from Mason 2004).
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This definition combines the aggressor aspect from Coser’s2, and the recipient aspect
of  Glasl’s3 conflict  definition.  There  are  many  other  definitions  of  “conflict”
emphasizing different aspects, but this one is best suited for our task. It includes the
whole  range  of  conflict  levels  from  non-escalated  up  to  highly  escalated  violent
conflict.
2.1 Characterization
Whenever analyzing conflicts, we must consider the system boundaries we have set,
and  reflect  on  how  they  relate  to  the  environment  the  conflict  is  embedded  in.
Depending on where we set the boundaries, the conflict will present itself differently. 
Once what to analyze (a conflict) and what is the perimeter (system boundary) has
been decided upon, one can look at its characteristics, keeping in mind that it may be
necessary to revise these first two steps while proceeding. Amongst other criteria, the
following six dimensions can be used to characterize a conflict: 1)  actors (with their
interests, fears, means, etc.), 2) issues, 3) options and strategies, 4) context (structures,
processes, rules, larger system), 5) causation, 6) escalation dynamics. 
Actors: They refer to everyone involved in a conflict, be this directly (conflict party)
or  as  an  outsider  that  becomes involved to  facilitate  conflict  transformation  (third
party). Actors can be individual people, groups of people or whole countries. 
Issues: These are  the “themes” of the conflict.  Issues should avoid judgments  and
interpretations, they should reflect what the people want to talk about. An example of
an issue could be: “water use” and not “the upstream village is using more water than
we are”. 
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Options/Strategies: Conflict  analysis  often  has  the  goal  of  assessing  future
developments, one reason for focusing on conflict parties' and third parties'  options
and strategies. Clarity on the various options and strategies helps to elucidate potential
common ground (i.e. "zone of agreement").
A key element of this dimension is the concept of power. Power relations between
actors determine how realistic various options are because power relates to the various
actors' means to implement strategies.
Context: A conflict is a sub-system in a larger system – its context. A conflict is often
carried out at a system’s weakest point, not necessarily where it is caused. One has to
pay attention to the possibility of the conflict being rooted in the very structure of an
organization or society, i.e. it might be misleading to localize the conflict in any sub-
system at all. 
Causation: Conflicts,  according to  most  conflict  theories,  are  never  caused by one
factor  alone.  The  analysis  of  causal  pathways  always  depends  on  who  is  the
“storyteller”.  The main cause  of a  conflict  is  seldom identical  with the causes the
parties involved believe they must act upon. The perception of causes may also change
over time. A conflict over scarce resources, for example, may develop into an ethnic
conflict, if ethnicity is used to group people to fight for their cause (Suliman 1997). 
Dynamics:  The dynamics of a conflict refers to the escalation level, to the form of
interaction between the conflict parties and its evolution.  
These  six  dimensions  can  generally  be  found  in  all  arenas,  in  interpersonal,
organizational and international conflicts.
7
5
10
15
20
25
2.2 Conflict Analysis – Three Frameworks
Two  broad  complementing  schools  of  thought  in  conflict  management  can  be
differentiated: “conflict transformation” (also termed facilitative or process oriented)
and  “conflict  resolution”  (also  termed  evaluative  or  problem-solving).  Conflict
transformation used as a descriptive concept addresses the process by which human
beings create conflicts, and once created, it conceptualizes the way human beings and
their  actions  are  “transformed”  by  the  conflict  dynamics  and  vice-versa.  Used
prescriptively, conflict transformation acknowledges that conflicts are inherent in all
social interactions, and the challenge is thus to transform how the conflicts are dealt
with,  rather  than  trying  to  get  rid  of  them,  a  goal  that  often  cannot  be achieved
(Lederach  1995;  Bush  and  Folger  1994).  The  conflict  transformative  approach
emphasizes  that  a  conflict  can  also  result  in  positive  outcomes  and  need  not  be
damaging in the end. A conflict can be transformed into an opportunity for the parties
involved. A key idea of conflict transformation understood prescriptively is that it tries
to  achieve  “sustainable  peace”,  i.e.  a  stable  combination  of  peace  and  justice
(Lederach 1995). 
Conflict resolution is more focused on outcome and less on process and relationship; it
seeks to resolve the conflict issues in the sense that the conflict is not present anymore
afterwards. Conflict resolution seeks to fulfill different interests through a (often third
party assisted) process of negotiation, a give and take that optimally concludes in a
“win-win” situation (Fisher et al. 1991). 
To analyze a conflict situation we present three conflict analysis frameworks: 1) the
position-interest-needs  framework  (Fisher  et  al.  1991)  focusing  on  “actors”  and
“issues”,  2)  the  power-rights-interests  framework  (Ury  et  al.  1993)  focusing  on
“actors”, “context” and “causation”, and the conflict escalation model (Glasl  2002)
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focusing on “dynamics”. “Options/strategies” play a role in all these frameworks. The
first two are oriented to  conflict  resolution, the last  one to conflict  transformation.
There is no generally accepted “conflict theory”.  Using these three approaches, we
sketch  a  wide  range  of  possible  aspects  of  a  conflict  and  point  out  underlying
principles. Furthermore, each of these approaches addresses issues crucial to markets. 
2.2.1 The Position-Interest-Need Framework
The framework organizes a conflict analysis along the questions “What do you want?”
and, subsequently, “Why do you want what you want?”. Critical, detached and honest
answers to these questions lead from “positions” to “interests” and “needs”. Positions
are what we say we want, fixed ideas and solutions to solving our problem (and the
“other” party’s problems!). An example for positions would be two countries staking
claims for fixed amounts of water from a shared river.  Interests are the reasons why
we want  what  we want.  The interests  could  be the  use  of  water  for  irrigation  or
hydropower, respectively. Fisher et al. (1991) point out that by focusing on interests in
negotiations we will better satisfy our goals than if we focus on positions. Mutually
compatible  gains  are  more  frequent  and  more  innovative  changes  in  collective
agreements  are  found  if  both  conflict  parties  use  an  interest-based  negotiation
approach (Paquet et al. 2000). There are indications that interest-based negotiation is a
useful  framework  for  analyzing  negotiation  in  many  situations,  even  if  it  is  not
universally applicable (Senger 2002).  Needs are the most powerful human interests.
Max-Neef  (1991)  differentiates  between  nine  basic  needs  that  people  strive  after
simultaneously:  subsistence,  protection,  affection,  understanding,  participation,
idleness, creation, identity and freedom. The human needs approach to introducing a
market would be to find out   – with the people affected  – if the market will  help to
satisfy  these  needs  or  not.  Often  the needs  are  the  same  irrespective  of  the other
differences between the conflict parties. In the example above, the common basic need
is to use the river as a basis for development (cf. the situation in the Nile Basin, Mason
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2004). According to Burton (1990), a conflict cannot be sustainably transformed if the
basic needs of the conflict parties are not satisfied4.
Conflicts  are  intrinsically  loaded  with  emotions  (Rosenberg 1999).  Reasoning  and
emotions need to be integrated, as emotional techniques are central  to post conflict
reconciliation processes (Long and Brecke 2003). Awareness regarding one’s own and
the other’s emotions is crucial to move from “positions” to “interests” and “needs”.
However, often people in conflicts are advised to focus on “facts”, emotions are seen
as childish complications of the problem. Expressing and recognizing emotions is one
of the first steps to changing a situation. By expressing our emotions like fear, anger
and hope, we can move closer to our interests, as we no longer have to grasp in panic
at our positions: 
“Ultimately,  however,  conflict  lies  not in  objective reality,  but in people’s
heads. (…) Fears, even if ill founded, are real fears and need to be dealt with.
Hopes, even if unrealistic, may cause war. Facts, even if established, may do
nothing to solve the problem.” (Fisher et al. 1991).
In summary, the position-interest-needs approach focuses on why we want something
and the basic needs behind this. Emotions and language need to be paid due attention.
2.2.2 The Power-Rights-Interests Framework
This  framework  focuses  on  the  different  approaches  conflict  parties  take  in
negotiations to reach an agreement. Conflict parties can try to resolve a conflict by
seeking to understand the other parties’ interests, or they can try to apply rights, laws
and contracts  or use coercive power to force the other party  to make concessions.
Human relationships are characterized by the respective power of the parties, the rules
and rights governing interaction, and interest based negotiations between the parties
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(Ury et al.  1993).  The conscious use of these elements  during negotiation is  more
effective then a pure interest-based approach (Lytle et al. 1999). 
Power can  be seen  as  our  possibilities  to  enforce  our  own will,  even  against  the
resistance  of  others.  One can  differentiate  between  coercive  power and  synergetic
power (= power that comes from cooperating). In mediation one seeks to tap into the
synergetic power that arises when the conflict parties address their problem together.
Here, if not specified otherwise, we use “power” in short to refer to coercive power.
Power  factors  are  specific  to  each  situation  and relative towards  the  other  parties
involved5.  If  actors  take  on a  power  focus  in  dealing  with  conflicts,  the  result  is
generally  a  distributive  agreement  that  may  lead  to  a  desire  for  revenge  or  the
initiation of future conflicts (Ury et al. 1993).
Imbalance of power (e.g. Deutsch 2002) is one of the main causes of conflicts related
to  “oppression”,  i.e.  to  experiences  of  repeated,  widespread,  systemic  injustice.
Consensus-based  negotiations  need  some  degree  of  “coercive”  power  symmetry
between conflict parties to be successful in generating “synergetic” power. If power
asymmetry exists, it is tempting for the relatively more powerful party to use coercive
rather than synergetic power. In this case a negotiated outcome may be blocked, one-
sided and the weaker party may be manipulated. Yet power is never equally balanced,
awareness  of  power  is  necessary  to  deal  constructively  with  it,  to  realize  when a
consensus  approach  is  at  all  possible.  Low-power  actors  can  nevertheless  be
influential.  Analyzing  the  role  of  the  Alliance  of  Small  Island  States  (AOSIS)
countries in climate negotiations, Larson (2003) shows how low-power actors may be
more  influential  in  multilateral  negotiations  than  in  bilateral  ones,  which  are  less
inclusive and transparent.
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Rights, rules and laws, formal and informal, are agreed on by a society, organization
or group to regulate interaction, avoid violence and make life more predictable. Rules
and laws represent a balance of interests on an abstract, generalized level. In contrast,
negotiations represent a balance of interests on a concrete level (see below). Greater
predictability  reduces  arbitrary  actions  of  relatively  more  powerful  people.  Our
freedom is curtailed by law to protect the freedom of others. Rules need to be backed
by power to be implemented. The power should be separated from the rules to avoid
power misuse. In a rights approach to negotiation,  conflict parties refer to existing
rights, laws and rules, especially if they are to their own position’s advantage (Ury et
al. 1993, Lytle et al. 1999).
Rules and laws in sum are invaluable to protect human rights and prevent and regulate
conflicts. Rules and laws, however, tend to focus on a “right-wrong” and “win-lose”
way of thinking. 
The  Power-Rights-Interest  framework  builds  on  the  implicit  assumption  of  rights
being  addressed  by  well  functioning  institutions.  In  asymmetric  power  situations,
however, the more powerful actor may misuse institutions and subvert existing rights,
or it may shape the "rights" and institutions in its favor in the first place.
Interest-based negotiations are  bargaining  processes,  where  each  party  defines  the
problem in terms  of  interests,  ways  are  sought  to  “enlarge  the pie”  and  mutually
acceptable solutions are aimed at (CRC 1998). In contrast to rules and laws, interest-
based negotiations  can discover new ways to meet the interests and needs of both
conflict  parties.  Such negotiations  focus  on “right-right”  and  “win-win”  solutions.
However, negotiating without consideration of the legal framework is as short sighted
as application of laws when negotiations could reach better solutions. 
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All three elements of power, rights and interest-based negotiations are needed. The
adequate “mix” of those is specific to a given situation. “Reciprocity” has a decisive
influence on the “mix”:  negotiators tend to reciprocate interests, less so rights  and
power.  Negotiators  may  refocus a  negotiation on interests  by the conscious use of
reciprocity (Lytle et al. 1999). The “mix” of these three dimensions can change over
time.  Often a  new problem is  first  solved by interest-based negotiations.  Once an
agreement  is  reached,  the  solution  is  then  codified  in  a  law  for  future  similar
situations. Laws can be viewed as frozen negotiation outcomes. 
2.2.3 The Conflict Escalation Model
Conflicts  escalate  when “heavier tactics are employed, issues proliferate,  increased
resources  are  devoted  to  the  struggle,  issues  become  more  general,  relationships
deteriorate, a goal of hurting the other party develops and additional participants enter
the struggle” (Pruitt and Rubin 1986). The concept of escalation and the corresponding
model developed by Glasl (2002) is related to the concept of “moral disengagement”6,
i.e.  the  process  we  go  through  during  escalation  to  make  it  acceptable  to  inflict
suffering  on  others  (Bandura  1999).  An  example  of  moral  disengagement  is  the
process of dehumanization, where an opponent is viewed as less than a human being.
Moral disengagement is one instance showing the effects the use of a certain language
can  have.  According  to  Rosenberg  (2004)  a  process  oriented  rather  than  static
language is needed for conflict transformation and resolution. It is needs rather than
position oriented. Smith (2002) also points out how  legal  language can be used to
justify  the  “erosion  of  distinctions  between  soldiers  and  civilians  and  thereby  to
legitimize  collateral  damage”.  Language  that  depersonalizes  and  delegates
responsibility is one form of moral disengagement.
The conflict escalation model is more process-oriented than the position-interest-needs
approach. Similar to the power-rights-negotiations approach, it focuses on relations,
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interactions  and perceptions.  However,  it  puts  more emphasis  on the dynamics  of
these relations and the potential development that can be expected. It frames different
levels of conflict according to different actions taken with respect to the opponent.
Fisher and Keashly (1991) developed this idea in a contingency model of third party
intervention.  The  escalation  model  and  the  psychological  phenomena  of  moral
disengagement can give some indication of when and how a third party can or should
intervene in a conflict situation in a constructive way, or when and how propositions
for  new  legal  and  institutional  frameworks  may  be  fruitfully  adopted.  Often  the
conflict parties operate at the same escalation level, but this is not a necessity.  
Glasl (2002) differentiates between nine levels of escalation, summarized in Table 1
below. Important steps in this process are from escalation level two to three, when
people no longer believe that talking helps. Another decisive step is from level four to
five, when a conflict party directly attacks an opponent seeking to cause face loss and
humiliation in public. The aim of analyzing the escalation level of a conflict party is
that the method of intervention in the conflict should be adapted to this level.  
[Insert table 1 here]
Table 1: Glasl’s escalation model (adapted from Glasl 2002).
Besides being on a certain level of escalation, a conflict can be “hot” or “cold” (Glasl
2002).  Hot  conflicts  are  extrovert  and  explosive.  Cold  conflicts  in  contrast  are
characterized by an avoidance of the opponent.  The importance of recognizing the
temperament of a conflict lies in avoiding the mistake of perceiving a cold conflict for
a  low  escalated  conflict.  Hot  and  cold  phases  may  alternate,  independent  of  the
escalation level of a conflict.
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3 Market Situations Seen as Conflicts
The conflict character of incomplete markets is described in this section. We illustrate
why it is likely that the conflict intrinsic in the market situation is not resolved or
transformed. We first discuss the complete market as the ideal reference case where no
conflict is present, and which market-based policy instruments try to approximate.
3.1 Complete Market
We  do  not  present  a  formal  exposition  of  a  complete  market  here.  We  only
recapitulate  the  characteristics  that  are  crucial  for  our  discussion7.  A  competitive
market in the general or partial equilibrium context with I consumers, J producers and
L commodities is characterized by 
- absence of external costs,
- complete information (esp. no asymmetric information, no transaction costs), 
- absence of market power of a single producer or consumer (all participants 
face the same prices they cannot influence), or of a group of such, i.e. 
absence of collusion,
-  absence of  dynamics  (potentially  painful  adjustments  while  reaching  the  
equilibrium are no topic) and possibility for free entry and exit (any  
new producer can decide to enter or leave the market at any time). 
In particular, no producer faces a downward-shaping supply curve that would signify
increasing  returns  to  scale  (an  increased  output  for  example  would  lead  to  lower
marginal costs and this would lead to a monopoly). The price of each traded good is
given by the marginal costs, where the achieved level of supply is given by the market
clearing condition that aggregate supply equals aggregate demand.
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A competitive  equilibrium is  characterized  by maximization  of  the  profit  of  each
producer,  maximization  of  the  utility  of  each  consumer  and  a  market  clearing
condition. The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem then states that such a situation is
Pareto  optimal,  i.e.  that  nobody  can  be  made  better  off  without  making  at  least
someone worse  off.  This  is  the  famous  “invisible  hand”  of  Adam  Smith.  “Pareto
optimality”  does  not  address  questions  of  distribution  and  equity.  The  Second
Fundamental  Welfare Theorem states  that  for  any  Pareto optimal  choice of utility
levels  of  the  consumers,  wealth  transfers  are  possible  that  lead  to  a  competitive
equilibrium with these utility  levels.  A central  authority  could  achieve  any Pareto
optimal  allocation  it  is  interested  in  by wealth  transfers  among  consumers.  These
results hold true for considerable generalization, but some assumptions are essential,
in particular the presence of a competitive market.
The  welfare  theorems  indicate  that  there  is  no  conflict  in  this  highly  idealized
theoretical setting. In a competitive market, producers and consumers are driven to
interact in a perfectly compatible way resulting in the equilibrium situation. Neither
market participant has the power to force his or her position onto others. This goes
along with increased efficiency as an overall goal.  
3.2 Incomplete Market 
The shortcoming of the complete market discussed above is its highly stylized nature.
If not all the necessary assumptions are met, the results fail to hold and the hitherto
optimal outcome is no longer optimal. This is always the case in reality – real markets
are  incomplete.  There  are  negative  externalities,  transaction  costs  and  asymmetric
information,  there  is  market  power,  collusion  takes  place,  there  are  painful
adjustments processes and market barriers can make free entry impossible. 
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We now show how each of these issues potentially induces a conflict. In reality, they
often come together further accentuating potential problems, particularly so under the
presence of power asymmetry,  which is  almost  always the case.  According to  the
conflict definition from section 2, three conditions have to be met: 1) interaction, 2)
experienced damage, 3) intended or ignored negative impacts. The first condition is
met by definition in market situations. The third is met in general,  as  each market
participant is generally not interested in the fate of the others. We thus discuss only the
second condition.
Negative externalities: Negative externalities arise if the price of a product does not
fully account for the (social) costs incurred in its production. The actions causing the
externality  are  often  directly  related  to  some  damage  incurred  by  another  party.
Examples are resource overuse or pollution. Often, there is forced interaction in the
context of negative externalities: parties primarily not part of the market are forced
into interaction as they incur parts of the costs and get nothing in exchange for it.
Asymmetric information, transaction costs: Without complete information, the quality
of goods and services cannot be verified in advance and in relation to other offers.
Transaction costs refer to the costs necessary to get this information, or to the costs
related to set up business relations or contracts, to enforce regulations, etc. This leads
to sub-optimal outcomes and to potential damage to the party not able or willing to get
full information or to incur the necessary costs. 
Market power, collusion: Under the presence of market power of single or groups of
actors, e.g. based on collusion, other parties incur damage almost by definition. The
power can for example be used to exploit them, to force them into disadvantageous
relations or to drive them out of the market.
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Adjustments, market barriers: The necessity of adjustments and the presence of market
barriers  in  the  dynamic  of real  market  situations  can  lead  to  damages  because of
missing financial means to deal with periods of adverse conditions or because of sunk
costs that cannot be recovered. 
4 Conflict Transformation in the Market Context
Conflict  analytical  approaches  are a  promising  tool  to deal  with potential  market-
related conflicts. Ideally, these and market-based policy approaches complement each
other.
4.1 Common Approach: Market-Based Policy Instruments
The main  goal  of this  approach is to  correct  for missing  aspects  of a  competitive
market,  thus creating situations  closer to an ideal  market  or even introducing new
markets. Having re-set the frame, the participants are again expected to act as in a
competitive market setting. They maximize profits and utility and thus – it is hoped –
also aggregated welfare will be maximized and overall efficiency will increase. 
The main problem with this approach is that it may correct some market failures by
transforming the situation towards a more competitive market, but it cannot always
achieve  the  resolution  or  transformation  of  the  conflict  inherent  in  an  incomplete
market situation. Some failures will remain even after the intervention, – because a
real  market  never  achieves  the  theoretical  ideal.  In  some  cases  the  market-based
instruments  and  the related  simplifying economic models fail  because they do not
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provide an adequate language and adequately broad concepts to grasp the complex
situations of the conflicts related to real markets. 
4.2 New Approach: Conflict Analysis
We  now  discuss  conflict  transformation  and  resolution  in  the  incomplete  market
situation employing the conflict analytical approaches introduced in section 2. 
4.2.1 The Position – Interest – Needs Approach 
Answers to the questions “What do you want?” and, subsequently, “Why do you want
what you want?” are sought. 
In a market context, on a formal, theoretical level, answers to the first question take
the form of “I want to make higher profits, to produce more cheaply and sell at higher
prices!” from the producers side and “I want to have greater purchasing power, buy
more cheaply, get more for my money!” from the consumer’s side. This is essentially
the same answer in different forms. The answer to the second “why” question is also
the same for both producers and consumers: “Because I want to maximize my profit,
my  utility!”  In  the  formal  market  context,  therefore,  positions  and  interests  are
essentially the same. For a  formal  economic analysis  in this context,  the needs by
definition take the same form as well. 
The position-interest-needs framework can break this mono-dimensional view of the
actors’ motivations in a market. This is essential, for in case of the introduction of a
market or a liberalization process there may be an inherent unresolved conflict. Only
the correct identification of positions, interests and needs allows for steps towards a
resolution or transformation (cf. section 2.2.3).
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To apply the concepts of position, interest and needs widens the language used. Actors
opposing or harmed by the introduction of a  new market can communicate  with a
language that expresses their perspective, rather than adopting the economic language
used by the proponents of the new market. Concerns would thereby no longer have to
be translated into the predominantly economic language. In this way concerns, which
have in the market-based approach been considered as  “soft  factors” of secondary
relevance are given greater importance. A more level communication field between
opponents and proponents can be created. 
4.2.2 The Power – Rights – Interests Approach 
“Power” is crucial in driving outcomes in any incomplete market. “Rights” and rules
refer to the legal and informal boundary conditions and context of a new or liberalized
market. “Interest-based” negotiations are crucial in the process that has led to these or
may alter them in the future. 
“Rights”  and  “interests”  are  important  in  both  the  market-based  and  the  conflict
analytical approach and also essentially have the same standing, although “interests”
are  more  narrowly  defined  in  the  economic  approach.  “Power”  is  perceived  very
differently. In the market context it mainly refers to economic issues and is a means to
hold the positions or to achieve any goal formulated. This ultimately signifies power
to influence the prices – be it directly or by capturing the political authorities to set
advantageous  rules,  or  by  other  channels.  In  conflict  analysis,  power  is  a  much
broader concept involving psychological aspects as well. It can even develop a certain
dynamic of its own and become a goal in itself, not only a means to fulfill positions,
interests and needs. 
To move towards resolution of a market-based conflict it is essential to identify the
power  distribution  between  the  involved  parties.  In  particular,  it  is  necessary  to
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achieve  this  not  only  regarding  economic  power  but  also  including  a  wider
understanding of the concept.
4.2.3 The Conflict Escalation Model
Not paying due attention to the possibility of conflict escalation in a market situation
may leave this process unrecognized until it gets out of hand making its mitigation
difficult. The escalation model provides a tool to recognize these essential dynamics in
time and to identify which actions should, and can, be taken.
In the market context, “moral disengagement” (cf. section 2.2.3) becomes relevant the
more indirect the relations between the participants are. Many do not care about the
labor conditions of the people that produce their clothing or food – or they do care but
do not act accordingly.  As the manufacturing often takes place thousands of miles
away  the  likelihood  of  disengagement  is  very  high.  Explicitly  addressing  moral
disengagement in markets could thus serve to make issues related to equity and power
a topic. 
4.2.4 Synthesis of the Three Approaches
Besides pointing to specific issues, each of the three approaches can be understood as
setting some minimal boundary conditions to the implementation of new markets or a
de-/re-regulation process. 
The  position-interest-needs framework sets  boundaries  with  regard  to  basic  needs.
Basic needs can be differentiated from luxury interests. Some political decisions and
societal agreements on what has to be delivered by public services and what not enters
this decision in almost every case. A distinction based on some objective criteria is
only  rarely  possible  (e.g.  in  case  of  the  amount  of  water  necessary  to  physically
survive).  This  approach  argues  that  goods  necessary  to  satisfy  basic  needs  (e.g.
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drinking water, hygiene and food preparation) are different from other consumption
goods (e.g. water to fill a swimming pool; cf. Perry et al. (1997) on water markets in
the third world). Guaranteeing access to the goods necessary to satisfy basic needs at
an equitable level avoids conflicts on this basic and vital level. It thus can be argued
that these goods should not be traded in a market, while a luxury good can well be.
Access to water for basic human needs, for example, has been declared by the UN as a
fundamental human right (UN 2003).
The  power-rights-interests approach  suggests  that  a  successful  introduction  of  a
market or liberalization is only possible if the power-distribution between the actors is
not too unequal. If it is, weaker parties need to be empowered or protected through
legal or other means. 
The  escalation  model draws  attention  to  possible  boundaries  regarding  conflict
dynamics.  If  there  is  already  a  conflict,  the  introduction  of  a  market  may  further
escalate the situation. In such a case it is highly unlikely that it will be implemented
successfully. Before introducing a market or taking steps towards a liberalization, it is
necessary to be aware of any potential conflict already present, be it latent or manifest.
Actions towards recognizing, resolving or transforming this conflict have to be taken
before further steps in the other issues are possible.
4.2.5 Two Examples
We  present  two  examples  to  show  the  potential  of  conflict  analysis  to  avoid  or
counteract market-induced conflicts.
1) Drinking Water Liberalization in Cochabamba: There are different perceptions of
the events related to  the privatization  of drinking water in  Cochabamba,  Bolivia’s
third largest city during 1999/2000. Reports agree that drinking water was privatized,
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water  rates  increased,  demonstrations  followed  and  the  drinking  water  was  then
returned to public control. There are differences on the causes and actors involved,
however.  According  to  a  popular  and  anti-globalization  oriented view,  water  bills
following privatization were unfair and for some residents were equal to a quarter of
their  income.  Demonstrations  by poor  people  followed,  including  violent  riots.  In
April 2000, the government sent troops, some 100 demonstrators were hurt, and one
person was killed (depending on the source, zero to nine deaths are reported). The
violence subsided only after the water system was returned to public control (de la
Fuente 2003). Despite such opposition in Cochabamba as well as elsewhere, the IMF
loan agreements often call  for some degree of water system privatization – this is
viewed critically as the rights of poor people are often not protected (Postel and Wolf
2001). 
Other sources draw a different picture. According to Nickolson and Vargas (2002), the
tariff  structure to be implemented after  privatization  was  progressive,  considerably
supporting poor people. Indeed, the tariffs were higher than before privatization, but in
combination with the obligation to connect the poor to the grid, poor people would
have been better off than before, when they were dependent on private water-vendors
who  charged  much  higher  rates  than  the  richer  citizens  had  to  pay  who  were
connected. According to this version of the story, the following causes of the conflict
are given: 1) the timing of connecting the people to the grid, 2) the requested rate of
return, and 3) the monopoly of the drinking water provider. The tariff increases were
implemented before any improvement of the system and increase in connections had
been undertaken. The requested rate of return on capital for these investments (16%)
was difficult to justify to the customers although the consortium claimed that this was
normal for such projects. Furthermore, the right to provide drinking water was given
exclusively to the firm taking over the system. Thus, several interest groups (such as
private water vendors or the richer households that had dug their own wells) who were
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going to lose from the privatization, seemed, according to Nickson and Vargas (2002),
to  have  played a  significant  role  in  organizing  the protest  of the poor  against  the
privatization plans.  These groups used popular  opposition to pursue their  interests,
mingling them with the necessity to assure the basic needs of the poor.
Dalton (2001) draws a similar detailed picture, partly focusing on different issues. She
points to the importance of the conflict between the central vs. regional government
over choice of the water supply project. The regional government favored the overly
expensive Miscuni project (a new dam and pipeline), while the central government
supported the much cheaper and more efficient Corani project (employing an existing
dam).  Vested  interests  and  the  widespread  support  of  the  local  population  finally
meant  that the Miscuni project was put in as a condition into the contract.  For the
population and the regional government, the realization of the long planned Miscuni
project was also a symbol to finally get central government support to the region of
Cochabamba that had been neglected for a long time.
A  second  point  emphasized  by  Dalton  (2001)  is  the  presence  of  an  institutional
structure for the poor that stemmed from historically powerful tin miners' unions. Tin
prices fell in the 1990s and mining collapsed, but the institutional structure and social
capital survived. The strong and effective civil protests largely built on the existence
of these structures (many farmers in the region were former tin miners).
The  water  privatization  in  Cochabamba  is  an  example  where  all  three  boundary
conditions identified above have been violated. First, basic needs and interests of the
several groups involved had not been systematically taken into consideration. There
was no participatory introduction of the privatization plans that could have taken some
of these interests on board by modifying the plans. This led to fear and an emotional
opposition  against  the  project  in  particular,  and  against  privatization  and
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“globalization”  in  general.  Second,  the  power  asymmetry  between  the  actors  was
ignored. The increasing number of people with unmet “basic needs” and disparity in
power  between  actors  has  also  to  be  seen  in  the  wider  context  of  the  structural
adjustment programme of 1984 and the major state reform programme of 1993 that
had not led to the promised results concerning growth and poverty alleviation. Third
and related to the above points, an already existing conflict between the actors was not
considered: the US-financed programs to eradicate coca-production in 1999 caused the
coca-leaf  farmers  in  the  region  to  lose  their  source  of  employment.   This  caused
considerable  migration  of  these  people  to  the  city  of  Cochabamba  with  the
corresponding consequences regarding unemployment rates and poverty (Nickson and
Vargas 2002). Thus all three boundary conditions for the successful implementation of
a privatization process were not explicitly addressed – to the detriment of both the
consumers and producers. 
Matters  were further  complicated  by the power relations  and conflicts  (central  vs.
regional government on the viability of the Miscuni project) in the very institutions
that  were  in  charge  of  framing  and  implementing  the  privatization.  This  led  to  a
contract that was ill-shaped from the beginning.  
In contrast to the classical regulatory approach, the conflict analytical concepts tools
presented above would have enabled the government or the consortium to recognize
these potential problems at an early stage. This would have given the possibility to act
accordingly  and  to  adapt  the  whole  process  to  the  genuine  situation  encountered,
paying due account to the different groups and their positions, interests and needs, to
the relevant power relations and to the latent conflicts in the region.
2) Globalize Markets / Labeling: Smallholders selling in global agricultural markets –
respectively depending on traders in these markets – are not protected against price
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shocks, e.g. in cotton, sugar, or coffee. The smallholders in developing countries face
market power, as they have to compete against  subsidized large-scale producers in
other countries  (cotton  from the US,  for example).  They often cannot  satisfy their
basic needs, as the profit  on the market  is  too low and they cannot  freely change
business,  as  the  infrastructure  and  skills  cannot  be  exchanged  quickly  –  if  at  all.
Transaction costs militate against identification or realization of new, more profitable
opportunities. Moral disengagement plays a crucial role, as the trade partners and the
consumers, often far away geographically and mentally, show a minimum interest in
the fate of the farmers – as long as they can buy at low prices. 
 “Labeling” can counter-act such problems. “Labeling” is a system to guarantee and
monitor  minimal  social  and  environmental  standards  for  the  farmers  and  their
products, examples include price guarantees or certification of organic production (see
e.g. Dankers 2003). Another approach to mitigate certain negative effects of global
markets is the “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” (DFID 2003) that aims
to  increase  transparency  of  financial  transactions  related  to  markets  with  natural
extractive  resources  (e.g.  oil,  copper,  diamonds).  Greater  transparency of  financial
transactions related to  resource extraction and trade would help prevent corruption,
state  failure  and  civil-war  in  countries  that  are  heavily  dependent  on  primary
commodity  exports, as  government  and companies  could be made accountable  for
money received or spent (Collier, Elliott et al. 2003).
Labels  and  regulations  to  increase  transparency  can  also  be  implemented  in  a
traditional economic setting – thus serving as a source of information. In the conflict
analytical  approach,  however,  their  application  would  go  further,  as  questions  of
equity play a role and whole firms, industries, economic sectors or even nations could
commit  themselves  to only buying and allowing certified products  – to counteract
moral disengagement in a comprehensive way.
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5 Conclusion
Any  real  market  is  potentially  a  conflict.  We  therefore  suggest  complementing
market-based  instruments  with  conflict  analytical  approaches  when  designing  and
assessing markets. Especially in cases where new markets for previously not traded
goods  are  introduced  or  where  tightly  regulated  markets  are  liberalized,  conflict
analytical concepts add new dimensions. 
By widening the traditional economic discussion through the introduction of concepts
like needs, power, escalation and moral disengagement, new views can be integrated.
The conflict analytical approach also provides minimal boundaries to the introduction
of  a  market  or  to  a  liberalization  process.  If  these  boundaries  are  not  met  –  if
fulfillment of basic needs is not guaranteed, the power asymmetry is too great or there
is  a  minimally  escalated  conflict  already  present  –  introduction  of  a  market  or  a
liberalization process are unlikely to be successful. Identification of these boundaries
can support cooperation between potential opponents and proponents of such policies.
The conflict analytical approaches make these the “soft” aspects of markets an explicit
topic. They support the identification of the limitations of markets and suggest ways to
mitigate these. This would not be possible if economic concepts were used alone, as
conflict  analytical  approaches  help  to  find  out  in  advance  whether  market-based
instruments may be successful. 
The introduction of conflict analytical concepts enriches the language that can be used
in such situations. This is especially important for the opponents of new markets as it
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allows them to formulate their points in their own language. They no longer need to
feel pressed to only use economic concepts, as is the case if only economics provides
the “legitimate” concepts to be used to assess a certain situation – as is frequently the
case. This helps to distinguish actions performed in best economic practice and in line
with cooperative behavior from actions that should be considered aggressive but come
under the cover of wise economic strategy. Conflict analysis adds a moral component
to the discussion. This might seem unscientific, but it is unavoidable if one wants to
deal with the real problems of our societies. We therefore argue that it is better to do
this systematically in a well-organized and well-enunciated way, rather than letting
the divide between proponents and opponents of markets increase.
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Endnotes
1There are exceptions, though, such as the discussion of regulatory impact assessment
in Kirkpatrick and Parker (2004) or the guidelines for water privatisation given in
Gleick et al. (2002).
2
 “For the purpose of this study, [the term social conflict] will provisionally be taken to
mean a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which
the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.” (Coser
1956).
3
 “A social conflict occurs when: 1) at least two parties interact in such a way that at
least  one of the parties  experiences incompatibility  in  their  interaction,  and  2)  the
damage resulting from their incompatible interaction is seen as stemming from the
other party. Interaction is understood as interaction of thought and/or feeling and/or
will  and action  (action  can  be  speech,  perceptions  alone  are  insufficient)”  (freely
translated from Glasl 2002).
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35
4
 Rather than power being a main cause of conflict, the human needs theory approach
says that it is people seeking to fulfil unmet needs that is a primary cause of conflict.
The difference between interests and needs is that needs are non-negotiable (Burton
1990).
5
 -  Micro  level  “power”  factors  affecting  interpersonal  relationships  include  age,
education, gender, rhetoric and social skills, etc. 
- Meso level “power” factors in organizations include, among others, available budget,
number and quality of employees, media presence and   networking, etc. 
- Macro level “power” factors in international conflicts include e.g.  socio-economic,
military, cultural and geographical factors.
6
  “The moral disengagement may centre, among other possibilities, on the cognitive
restructuring of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one by moral justification,
sanitizing language, and advantageous comparison.” (Bandura 1999).
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Escalation Level Description
1. Hardening Positions  harden,  first  confrontation.  The  conviction  still  exists  that
tensions can be solved in discussion. There are no fixed camps.
2. Debate Polarization  of  thinking,  feeling  and  will.  Black  and  white  thinking.
Perception of superiority and inferiority.
3. Actions “Speaking will not help anymore”. Strategy of “fait accompli”, presenting
the opponent with facts on the ground. Empathy is lost. There is a danger
of false interpretation of the other side.
4. Images,
coalitions
The parties  maneuver  each  other  into  negative  roles  and  fight  these
roles. Parties seek support from people who have not been involved so
far.
5. Loss of face Public and direct attack, aiming at the loss of face of the opponent.
6. Threats Threats and counter threats. The conflict accelerates through ultimata.
7. Limited
destructive blows
The opponent is no longer seen as a human being. As a consequence of
dehumanization,  limited  destructive  blows  are  legitimate.  Values  are
shifted, ones own “small” loss is seen as a worthy investment.
8. Fragmentation Destruction and fragmentation of the opponents system is a main aim.
9. Together into
the abyss
Total  confrontation  without  any  possibility  of  stepping  back.  The
destruction of oneself is accepted as the price of the destruction of the
opponent.
Table 2: Glasl’s escalation model (adapted from Glasl 2002).
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